A New Political Taxonomy?

In my last post, I was trying to get an idea of what exactly is meant when someone says that he or she is an anarchist. Part of what I tried to do was map out some of the logical space of the different positions one might take regarding the state. Each possible view, I suggested, consists (for the most part) of where one's moral views about the state intersects with his or her views about the feasibility of statelessness. I was less explicit about this and I think I ended up with a pretty incomplete taxonomy of positions. I'd like to improve on that last post and give it another go by giving a more complete list of both the positions one can take on the morality of the state and of the positions one can take on the feasibility of statelessness. I'll have some more comments on this new taxonomy below. 

Moral Positions

A. The state is morally neutral. It can be justified, say, by the consent of the people or by the social contract or whatever. The justification may also depend on whether or not the state is limited to certain functions that are thought to be legitimate.

B. The state is prima facie immoral. This is a kind of default moral presumption against the state, but one which can be over-ridden. This means that, all things being equal, the state would be unjustified. More specifically, since the state is a coercive means for pursuing socially desirably ends, the state would not be justified if those socially desirably ends could be achieved by non-coercive (or less-coercive) means. 

C. The state is immoral and unjustified simpliciter. This is a strong deontological position, holding that there are no other overriding considerations that could justify the state.

(There is logical space for the extreme pro-state position that all states are always moral everywhere, but this is strange and isn't really helpful for my purposes)

Positions on Statelessness

1. Statelessness is not feasible. Law, order, peace, prosperity, etc. require at least some government. The position can range in both the degree of certainty (some will be more convinced of this position than others) as well as how bad anarchy is believed to turn out (some are thinking a decrease in wealth and stability while others are thinking hell on earth).

2. Agnosticism about statelessness. The evidence and research are not sufficient to convince the agnostic that anarchy will work well in practice. Note also that the agnostic is not convinced that anarchy will not work well in practice.

3. Statelessness is feasible. This position will also range (as in position 1) in both the degree of certainty as well as how much better anarchy will be.

The Improvements to my Taxonomy

What I described as "moral but not practical anarchism" in my last post can now be divided into two positions: B1 and C1. One who accepts C1 does not allow for his moral opposition to the state to be effected by the (presumed) impracticality of anarchy, and thus is likely to maintain the normative position of advocating anarchy. One who accepts B1, on the other hand, allows practicality concerns to override his moral opposition to the state, and thus is likely to conclude that the state is justified, or at least hold the normative position against anarchy in practice. C1 is more deserving of the label "anarchist" than B1.

I think adding the agnostic position is a virtue of this new taxonomy. At the very least it allows for a bit more intellectual honesty among those whose moral positions are A or B. This is because while the moral case against the state can be made easily by fairly simple arguments, the practical (or consequentialist) case in favor of anarchy is much harder for one to accept. It involves a lot of serious intellectual engagement, which is something that not everyone can afford. This way, one who is morally opposed to the state can avoid blindly accepting the idea that anarchy would turnout great, and also avoid having to accept a statist position. The practicality of anarchy is, after all, an empirical claim, for which evidence is not abundant, and to which a limited amount ot intellectual energy has been devoted. I would like to say that one accepting B2 or C2 can be deserving of the label "anarchist," depending on whether or not his normative position is one of advocating anarchy.

Another consideration that Pete Leeson makes clear is that the practicality of anarchy depends on the likely statist alternative. Making the case for anarchy in Somalia is pretty easy, because the statist alternative sets the bar pretty low. Making the case for anarchy in the USA would be tougher, as most of us here seem to live pretty decent lives under a relatively non-predatory government. So, it wouldn't be inconsistent for one to advocate anarchy in Somalia, while remaining agnostic (or even pessimistic) about anarchy in the USA. So, I suppose this throws a bit of a wrench into my taxonomy, as one can hold positions 1, 2, or 3 depending on the case. 

I'm not necessarily making any arguments here; just trying to clear some things up in a way that might be helpful in figuring out where exactly I stand on these questions, and perhaps in a way that can be helpful for others as well. I'm open to further comments, criticisms, and suggestions. I suppose the taxonomy is getting a bit complex, but I think it's a much better way of thinking about political positions than the left-right paradigm.