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Nietzschean Critique of the State: Part 2 of 2
Nietzsche’s Standard of Value
In the Preface to his Genealogy, Nietzsche explains the standard of value for his critique of morality. He explains that his main concern in writing the book is to discover the “value of morality” (P: 5). What is needed, he says, is a “critique of moral values, for once the value of these values must itself be called into question” (P: 6). And the standard that he suggests is a kind of human flourishing.
The questions Nietzsche thinks are necessary to ask are as follows:
Have [modern moral values] inhibited or furthered human flourishing up until now? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or, conversely, do they betray the fullness, the power, the will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future? (GM P: 3)
He suspects modern morality as a “great danger to humanity, its most sublime lure and temptation” (GM P: 5). He wonders: Is morality perhaps the means by which
the present were living at the expense of the future?...So that precisely morality would be to blame if a highest power and splendor of the human type – in itself possible – were never attained? So that precisely morality were the danger of dangers? (P: 6, see also GM I. 12)
Nietzsche sees modern morality as dangerous in its potential to prevent the development of a certain human ideal. But as he suggests later in the Genealogy, as well as in countless other places throughout his work, this ideal is not the “longevity of [the] race” or “welfare of the many.” Rather, he is concerned with “developing a stronger type” (GM Note). This stronger type can be roughly described as follows: he is solitary and independent, he is goal-oriented in his approach to great artistic and other creative projects, he had affirmative attitude to his own life as well as all life in general, he has a great confidence in himself over and above others, and he is hard on himself in imposing self-discipline.
In short, it seems that Nietzsche is a kind of consequentialist about a certain type of (Nietzschean) human flourishing. According to this consequentialism, the value of X is determined, roughly, by its conduciveness to the development and flourishing of higher types as described above. Here, “X” can refer to a code of values (a morality) as well as an institution (a state).
Nietzsche’s Evaluation of Morality
Nietzsche’s project in the Genealogy is to demonstrate that the prevalence of modern moral values in society has undermined the development of such a higher type. If we look back on history and trace the development of morality, we will see the effects that it has had on societies in which it has become prevalent. Nietzsche sees that, as modern moral values have become prevalent in society, they have become enticing to potential higher types, many of whom have come to accept these values. The result is, roughly, that they have devoted their energies and abilities to more compassionate or altruistic endeavors, as opposed to self-discipline and creative activity. Their flourishing, then, is undermined. And it is this fact that is decisive for Nietzsche’s negative evaluation of modern moral values and considering them a danger.
A Nietzschean Evaluation of the State
Much more can be said about Nietzsche’s critique of morality, but enough has been said in order to use it as the model for a Nietzschean evaluation of the state. What I will argue is that, just as Nietzsche believes modern moral values to be dangerous in the way described above, the same can be said of the state. The state is a danger, for Nietzsche, in the following interrelated ways. First, it lures the higher types into its service and ranks. In doing so, it redirects their energies from higher (creative) work to lower (political, stately) purposes. Even further, it imposes values upon those it governs, thus undermining the important task of creating values, which is a supremely important (and perhaps even essential) function for the individual human being.
Most of the following discussion will be based the section from Zarathustra (I. 11) discussed above. There Nietzsche describes the state as a great enticer of those with the potential to flourish as higher men:
Oh, even to you, you great souls, it whispers its dark lies! Unfortunately it detects the rich hearts who gladly squander themselves! Yes, it also detects you, you vanquishers of the old God!...It wants to gather heroes and honorable men around itself, this new idol! Gladly it suns itself in the sunshine of your good consciences – the cold monster!
Just as morality entices these higher types into the service of its ideals, so does the state. What the state does is “steal…the works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise.” It needs them and their energies for its own legitimacy; and perhaps also in order simply to survive and function. These “great souls” and “heroes” – those with enough life and energy even to “squander” – are redirected from creative pursuits. The state, then, recruits them for its own stately, collectivist endeavors, which might be nationalistic, or totalitarian, or egalitarian in nature
A more specific danger of the state, Nietzsche suggests, is that it can turn great men into politicians.
Watch them scramble, these swift monkeys! They scramble all over each other and thus drag one another down into the mud and depths. They all want to get to the throne, it is their madness – as if happiness sat on the throne! Often mud sits on the throne – and often too the throne on mud.
The state, and the politics associated with it, provides great men with an arena for competition. But this is unlike athletic or intellectual competition. In these contexts, competitors (and even enemies!) can come together in a kind of reverence or respect, and they push each other to new excellences. But political competition is nothing more than a race to the bottom; for sitting in political office is akin to sitting in mud. Politics is simply monkey business – a degrading, less-than-human activity.
The state also undermines the development of those who do not become part of its apparatus. It does so by assuming the role of value arbiter. At the very beginning of the section of “On the New Idol,” Nietzsche describes his discussion of the state as his “words about the deaths of peoples.” Value creation (“esteeming”), for Nietzsche, should not be performed by the state, but is best left to individuals or to “peoples.” Indeed, it is that which Nietzsche holds to be among the highest (if not the highest) human purpose or ideal. In a later section, “On a Thousand and One Goals,” Zarathustra makes the following comments:
No greater market place on earth did Zarathustra find than good and evil. No people could live that did not first esteem.
A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of their will to power.
Humans first placed value into things, in order to preserve themselves...That is why they call themselves ‘human,’ that is: the esteemer. Esteeming is creating: hear me, you creators! Esteeming itself is the treasure and jewel of all esteemed things. (Z I. 15)
Value creation, Nietzsche is suggesting, is an intrinsically valuable human activity. The valuing itself is more important than the specific values that result. “Esteeming” is even explained as an activity essential to humans – for it is this activity after which they are named. Even further, it is also suggested that value creation has a kind of instrumental value. That is, it is a necessary condition for a group of individuals to achieve an identity as “a people.”
But this activity is undermined by the state, which makes value creation unnecessary by imposing from above its own values upon individuals and peoples. The state says: “On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordaining finger of God am I” (Z I. 11) It is not simply a value creator, but the value creator. In other words, the state universalizes values, and seeks to close the door on the possible alternatives. In doing so, it undermines the development of higher types in two important ways. First, it removes the need for these individuals to create their own values. As Hunt (1991) describes it, the state “provides us with a very attractive opportunity to commit this fatal evasion.” In doing so, “the state becomes a source of self-alientation, of estrangement from our true nature." [1] In other words, human nature as “esteemer” becomes unnecessary, as the state takes on this task for us. One might say that it "crowds out" the private enterprise of value creation. Second, the universalized values that the state imposes from above will not be conducive to the flourishing of higher types. That is, these state-imposed values are not at all likely to promote things like individualism or severe self-discipline. Rather, they are most-likely to be democratic-egalitarian or nationalist-collectivist in nature, the types of values that would reduce great men to the level of the herd or direct their energies to the goals of the collective.
Nietzsche ends “On the New Idol” by entreating the great souls simply to run away: “My brothers, do you want to choke in the reek of their snouts and cravings? Smash the windows instead and leap into the open! Get out of the way of the bad smell!” Their best bet – perhaps their only bet – for flourishing is to get away from the state: “There, where the state ends, only there begins the human being who is not superfluous…There, where the state ends…the rainbow and the bridges of the overman?” (Z I. 11).
When we hold the state to Nietzsche’s standard of value – namely, his brand of consequentialism about the flourishing of higher types – we see that, at the very least, the state is a great danger. It entices potential higher types of men, puts them into the service of its stately ideals, and thus undermines their flourishing in the pursuit of higher, more creative, endeavors.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is perhaps also worth considering whether this Nietzschean critique of the state has any broader importance in the context of political thought. I will briefly discuss a point I made earlier about the compatibility of what Nietzsche said about the state with the classical liberal tradition. I find this point worth mentioning because much of what Nietzsche says about the state does indeed sound like something a classical liberal would say. Indeed, one can interpret what Nietzsche says about the state "crowding out" the individual in the realm of value creation as a libertarian-spirited complaint about the state taking on a role that would best be filled by the private sector. One might also interpret what Nietzsche says about the state enticing higher men into its ranks as lamenting the fact that the state's employment of bureaucrats and “technocrats” is an utterly wasteful use of human capital. Thus, it is very tempting for a classical liberal or libertarian to co-opt Nietzsche for his own purposes (which is no rare occurrence for Nietzsche). Heck, Mencken interpreted Nietzsche as an individualist anarchist. And it's not unreasonable to think that Nietzsche, to some extent, would share some of these ideals. But, at the very same time, it is very obvious that Nietzsche was no champion of natural rights or political freedom. And he does not criticize the state because of its inherent basis in force, fraud, and theft, or for its inefficiency. Rather, Nietzsche is concerned with the development and flourishing of the few elites. And he often seem to have little problem with this flourishing taking place at the expense of the many regular folk. This value, which I have argued is central to his critiques of both morality and the state, is hardly liberal, classical or otherwise.
1 See Chapter 3, section 3: “The Phenomenology of Citizenship.” Here is an online version of this chapter: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/HUNT.htm
“A Nietzschean Critique of the State”
Part II
Nietzschean Evaluation
Nietzsche’s Standard of Value
In the Preface to his Genealogy, Nietzsche explains the standard of value for his critique of morality. He explains that his main concern in writing the book is to discover the “value of morality” (P: 5). What is needed, he says, is a “critique of moral values, for once the value of these values must itself be called into question” (P: 6). And the standard that he suggests is a kind of human flourishing. The questions Nietzsche thinks are necessary to ask are as follows:
Have [modern moral values] inhibited or furthered human flourishing up until now? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or, conversely, do they betray the fullness, the power, the will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future? (GM P: 3)
He suspects modern morality as a “great danger to humanity, its most sublime lure and temptation” (GM P: 5). He wonders: Is morality perhaps the means by which
the present were living at the expense of the future?...So that precisely morality would be to blame if a highest power and splendor of the human type – in itself possible – were never attained? So that precisely morality were the danger of dangers? (P: 6, see also GM I. 12)
Nietzsche sees modern morality as dangerous in its potential to prevent the development of a certain human ideal. But as he suggests later in the Genealogy, as well as in countless other places throughout his work, this ideal is not the “longevity of [the] race” or “welfare of the many.” Rather, he is concerned with “developing a stronger type” (GM Note). This stronger type can be roughly described as follows: he is solitary and independent, he is goal-oriented in his approach to great artistic and other creative projects, he had affirmative attitude to his own life as well as all life in general, he has a great confidence in himself over and above others, and he is hard on himself in imposing self-discipline.
In short, it seems that Nietzsche is a kind of consequentialist about a certain type of (Nietzschean) human flourishing. According to this consequentialism, the value of X is determined, roughly, by its conduciveness to the development and flourishing of higher types as described above. Here, “X” can refer to a code of values (a morality) as well as an institution (a state).
Nietzsche’s Evaluation of Morality
Nietzsche’s project in the Genealogy is to demonstrate that the prevalence of modern moral values in society has undermined the development of such a higher type. If we look back on history and trace the development of morality, we will see the effects that it has had on societies in which it has become prevalent. Nietzsche sees that, as modern moral values have become prevalent in society, they have become enticing to potential higher types, many of whom have come to accept these values. The result is, roughly, that they have devoted their energies and abilities to more compassionate or altruistic endeavors, as opposed to self-discipline and creative activity. Their flourishing, then, is undermined. And it is this fact that is decisive for Nietzsche’s negative evaluation of modern moral values and considering them a danger.
A Nietzschean Evaluation of the State
Much more can be said about Nietzsche’s critique of morality, but enough has been said in order to use it as the model for a Nietzschean evaluation of the state. What I will argue is that, just as Nietzsche believes modern moral values to be dangerous in the way described above, the same can be said of the state. The state is a danger, for Nietzsche, in the following interrelated ways. First, it lures the higher types into its service and ranks. In doing so, it redirects their energies from higher (creative) work to lower (political, stately) purposes. Even further, it imposes values upon those it governs, thus undermining the important task of creating values, which is a supremely important (and perhaps even essential) function for the individual human being.
Most of the following discussion will be based the section from Zarathustra (I. 11) discussed above. There Nietzsche describes the state as a great enticer of those with the potential to flourish as higher men:
Oh, even to you, you great souls, it whispers its dark lies! Unfortunately it detects the rich hearts who gladly squander themselves! Yes, it also detects you, you vanquishers of the old God!...It wants to gather heroes and honorable men around itself, this new idol! Gladly it suns itself in the sunshine of your good consciences – the cold monster!
Just as morality entices these higher types into the service of its ideals, so does the state. What the state does is “steal…the works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise.” It needs them and their energies for its own legitimacy; and perhaps also in order simply to survive and function. These “great souls” and “heroes” – those with enough life and energy even to “squander” – are redirected from creative pursuits. The state, then, recruits them for its own stately, collectivist endeavors, which might be nationalistic, or totalitarian, or egalitarian in nature
A more specific danger of the state, Nietzsche suggests, is that it can turn great men into politicians.
Watch them scramble, these swift monkeys! They scramble all over each other and thus drag one another down into the mud and depths. They all want to get to the throne, it is their madness – as if happiness sat on the throne! Often mud sits on the throne – and often too the throne on mud.
The state, and the politics associated with it, provides great men with an arena for competition. But this is unlike athletic or intellectual competition. In these contexts, competitors (and even enemies!) can come together in a kind of reverence or respect, and they push each other to new excellences. But political competition is nothing more than a race to the bottom; for sitting in political office is akin to sitting in mud. Politics is simply monkey business – a degrading, less-than-human activity.
The state also undermines the development of those who do not become part of its apparatus. It does so by assuming the role of value arbiter. At the very beginning of the section of “On the New Idol,” Nietzsche describes his discussion of the state as his “words about the deaths of peoples.” Value creation (“esteeming”), for Nietzsche, should not be performed by the state, but is best left to individuals or to “peoples.” Indeed, it is that which Nietzsche holds to be among the highest (if not the highest) human purpose or ideal. In a later section, “On a Thousand and One Goals,” Zarathustra makes the following comments:
No greater market place on earth did Zarathustra find than good and evil. No people could live that did not first esteem.
A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of their will to power.
Humans first placed value into things, in order to preserve themselves...That is why they call themselves ‘human,’ that is: the esteemer. Esteeming is creating: hear me, you creators! Esteeming itself is the treasure and jewel of all esteemed things. (Z I. 15)
Value creation, Nietzsche is suggesting, is an intrinsically valuable human activity. The valuing itself is more important than the specific values that result. “Esteeming” is even explained as an activity essential to humans – for it is this activity after which they are named. Even further, it is also suggested that value creation has a kind of instrumental value. That is, it is a necessary condition for a group of individuals to achieve an identity as “a people.”
But this activity is undermined by the state, which makes value creation unnecessary by imposing from above its own values upon individuals and peoples. The state says: “On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordaining finger of God am I” (Z I. 11) It is not simply a value creator, but the value creator. In other words, the state universalizes values, and seeks to close the door on the possible alternatives. In doing so, it undermines the development of higher types in two important ways. First, it removes the need for these individuals to create their own values. As Hunt (1991) describes it, the state “provides us with a very attractive opportunity to commit this fatal evasion.” In doing so, “the state becomes a source of self-alientation, of estrangement from our true nature." [1] In other words, human nature as “esteemer” becomes unnecessary, as the state takes on this task for us. One might say that it "crowds out" the private enterprise of value creation. Second, the universalized values that the state imposes from above will not be conducive to the flourishing of higher types. That is, these state-imposed values are not at all likely to promote things like individualism or severe self-discipline. Rather, they are most-likely to be democratic-egalitarian or nationalist-collectivist in nature, the types of values that would reduce great men to the level of the herd or direct their energies to the goals of the collective.
Nietzsche ends “On the New Idol” by entreating the great souls simply to run away: “My brothers, do you want to choke in the reek of their snouts and cravings? Smash the windows instead and leap into the open! Get out of the way of the bad smell!” Their best bet – perhaps their only bet – for flourishing is to get away from the state: “There, where the state ends, only there begins the human being who is not superfluous…There, where the state ends…the rainbow and the bridges of the overman?” (Z I. 11).
When we hold the state to Nietzsche’s standard of value – namely, his brand of consequentialism about the flourishing of higher types – we see that, at the very least, the state is a great danger. It entices potential higher types of men, puts them into the service of its stately ideals, and thus undermines their flourishing in the pursuit of higher, more creative, endeavors.
Conclusion
To conclude, it is perhaps also worth considering whether this Nietzschean critique of the state has any broader importance in the context of political thought. I will briefly discuss a point I made earlier about the compatibility of what Nietzsche said about the state with the classical liberal tradition. I find this point worth mentioning because much of what Nietzsche says about the state does indeed sound like something a classical liberal would say. Indeed, one can interpret what Nietzsche says about the state "crowding out" the individual in the realm of value creation as a libertarian-spirited complaint about the state taking on a role that would best be filled by the private sector. One might also interpret what Nietzsche says about the state enticing higher men into its ranks as lamenting the fact that the state's employment of bureaucrats and “technocrats” is an utterly wasteful use of human capital. Thus, it is very tempting for a classical liberal or libertarian to co-opt Nietzsche for his own purposes (which is no rare occurrence for Nietzsche). Heck, Mencken interpreted Nietzsche as an individualist anarchist. And it's not unreasonable to think that Nietzsche, to some extent, would share some of these ideals. But, at the very same time, it is very obvious that Nietzsche was no champion of natural rights or political freedom. And he does not criticize the state because of its inherent basis in force, fraud, and theft, or for its inefficiency. Rather, Nietzsche is concerned with the development and flourishing of the few elites. And he often seem to have little problem with this flourishing taking place at the expense of the many regular folk. This value, which I have argued is central to his critiques of both morality and the state, is hardly liberal, classical or otherwise.
1 See Chapter 3, section 3: “The Phenomenology of Citizenship.” Here is an online version of this chapter: http://philosophy.wisc.edu/hunt/HUNT.htm
