Moral Duties v. Politically-Enforced Duties

I've been reading the book Elements of Justice by David Schmidtz. In it, he lays out a pluralistic theory of justice, according to which Justice is not reducible to one principle (like non-aggression or property-rights). Rather, Justice consists of four elements which relate to and constrain each other in dynamic ways. So far, I recommend (it was ranked one of the top ten pro-liberty books of the last decade by the Atlas Foundation).

Anyways, when discussing reciprocity, Schmidtz makes a couple nice points that have much broader implications that would do classical liberals (and their opponents) some good to take seriously. He quotes a case from philosopher Robert Nozick in which your neighbors institute a public address system without your wanting it:

They post a list of names, one for each day, your among them. On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) a person is to run the public address system, play records over it, give news bulletins, tell amusing stories he has heard, and so on. After 138 days on which each person has done his part, your day arrived. Are you obligated to take your turn?

Nozick's answer is No. Sure, this is a nice service that your neighbors got together to create, and they've certainly done well in informing and entertaining you through it. But you never asked for any of this. Why do you now have an obligation to cooperate with this system? Schmidtz agrees, in a qualified sense. While you may not have a strong obligation to provide a day's worth of information and entertainment (especially in the sense that your neighbors have no right to make you do it by employing violence or the threat thereof), 

it does not imply that the correct response is for use to decide we owe nothing...we receive unasked for favors all the time. A proper moral agent does not enjoy them with no thought of reciprocation. (97-98)

Perhaps you have truly enjoyed the last 138 days. The right thing to do just might be to (perhaps begrudgingly) reciprocate, despite never having asked to be part of the system. Whether this is correct, however, is not the point. The point is the subtle distinction between strong duties/obligations (perhaps those which can properly be enforced by coercive (political) means) and "weaker" moral obligations that no one has the right to enforce. 

My point is that this type of distinction is often missed by both classical liberals and their opponents, albeit in different ways. Think of the distinction between wealth distribution via taxation and private voluntary charity. "Progressives" often say the following about the former: "Everyone should pay his share" or "society ought to help out those in need" or will go as far as to explicitly refer to it as some sort of charity. Clearly, when I pay taxes only because I choose not to be imprisoned, I am not engaging in an act of charity. But classical liberals can, and often do, go wrong in this regard, as well. The fact that I deserve the wealth that I earn and the resources I acquire with it is often invoked as a (I think correct) defense against redistribution via taxation. Sometimes, however, the attitude can be taken too far and transformed into a kind of resentment against private efforts to help the poor, or even the homeless themselves. One can detect this in the writings of Ayn Rand.

The point: If "progressives" truly care about individuals being charitable and "paying their share," they ought to devote their time and resources to making sure private charities are thriving, not to political campaigns who want to redistribute via taxation. On the other hand, if we classical liberals truly believe that government cannot win the war on poverty, and if we truly care about shrinking government, then we ought not to ignore the true poverty that does exist, and embrace private means of addressing it. 

One other issue illustrates the distinction. Recently, at a "4/20 bake sale" at which FSU's YAL and SSDP were raising money for marijuana legalization efforts, some kid remarked that legalization would make pot much less cool. But whether or not smoking pot (or doing any other drug) is cool, or healthy, or morally good, is completely beside the point. The point (that classical liberals would make) is that we should have the right to engage in these peaceful activities, which means no government has the right to prevent us from doing so by means of force. This does not mean, however, that engaging in these activities is cool, or healthy, or morally good. On the contrary: while I do agree that one has the right to do drugs, I don't quite find them cool, or healthy, or morally good at all. The point: Moralists ought to realize that it is completely consistent to oppose drugs (on grounds of morality) while opposing the drug war (heck, also on grounds of morality). Classical liberals would do good to remember that just because we oppose the drug war, does not mean that we ought to embrace the use of drugs. In fact, because we don't want government dictating how we live our lives, and because we believe in personal responsibility and self-governance (not in the democracy sense, but in a more literal sense), we might think that it behooves us to behave as a responsible free citizen should.